Both Democrats and Republicans oppose the intervention for an array of reasons:

• the cost of the effort,
• the potential for escalation and the US long-term role in a prolonged civil war,
• the message it sends to other countries about the US definition of sovereignty, and
• the lack of defined objectives

But the true Congressional opposition lies in the potential for unchecked military action in the Executive Branch by the weakening of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (WPR).  By soft-peddling the President’s actions in Libya, the Administration hasembarked on a troublesome journey along a slippery slope by asserting that the Libyan intervention does not rise to the level of ‘hostilities,’ a term that remains undefined by the WPR.  On behalf of the Administration, State Department legal advisor, Harold Koh, contends that the use of unmanned drones for attack, the limited risk of harm to US forces and the limited ability for Libyan forces to exchange meaningful fire with US forces suggest that the US actions in Libya do not warrant the financial and reporting disclosures mandated by the War Powers Resolution.  In order words: no accountability required.

However, those arguments belie the critical role of Congress in the brave new world of technological warfare.  If we buy what Mr. Koh is selling, all future drone and US-based missile attacks would not technically involve face to face conflict or imperil ground troops, and therefore, such actions would fall outside of Congressional oversight.  However, the use of a faceless military force against another nation does not create any fewer ramifications for the US or its citizens.  The WPR was not simply developed to protect our soldiers from direct harm; it was promulgated to ensure the President did not engage in military action without full accountability and oversight from the Legislative Branch as originally contemplated by Art. 1, Sec 8 of the US Constitution.

History Lesson:   The War Powers Resolution of 1973 was written as a modification of the original War Powers Act of 1941 that FDR initiated which granted him greater authority to reorganize the executive branch, independent government agencies, and government corporations, as well as censor mail and other forms of communication between the United States and foreign countries during World War II.  A Second War Powers Act was passed in 1942 further extending executive branch power, allowing for the acquisition (under condemnation if necessary) of land for military or naval purposes.   In the aftermath of the Korean War and during the last phases of the Vietnam War, Congress re-examined the broad powers conferred by the WPA and drafted the War Powers Resolution of 1973, designed to re-establish the checks and balances associated with the engagement of the US Military consistent with the intent of the Framers of the Constitution.

This week, by a vote of 14-5, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with four Republicans crossing the aisle – Rubio (FL), Inhofe (OK), Isakson (GA), and Barrasso (WY) – authorized US involvement in the NATO-led mission in Libya.  The measure will now go to the Republican-controlled House for consideration. If adopted, SFRC language would permit US involvement in Libya for up to one year, however, there would be no authorized ground support.

Circling back to the WPR [and absent from the majority of the media accounts from the recent SRFC vote]…. Ranking Member, Dick Lugar (IN) addressed Harold Koh/ the Administration’s characterization of the Libyan intervention, and on June 28th, defined the current US military operations in Libya as ‘hostilities’ for the purposes of the War Powers Resolution within the SFRC Resolution .  In doing so, he put a roadblock in the Administration’s interpretation of the Libyan intervention “from becoming an accepted precedent that future administrations may rely on to conduct significant and prolonged military engagements without Congressional authorization.”

We still do not have an answer as to the Executive Branch’s objective in Libya, but we do have some limits on how long the Congressional rope will be.  All I know is that the political landscape has been turned on its axis.  Republican hawks are now calling for stricter oversight in the consideration of military action (the former GOP economic stimulus package) and the dove-loving Democrats are now seeking expansive executive powers in the deployment of military assets on foreign soil.  Could this be the ripple effects of Japan’s earth-tilting earthquake?

Not to over-simplify, but the Odyssey Dawn game plan was to attack from the outside to weaken Libyan strongholds, limit Gadhafi’s ability to attack from the air and allow the rebel forces to take control of territory in chunks.  Okay, not a bad plan….  if you’re playing Risk against an eight year old.    But unlike basketball or board games there were some important endgame decisions that required deliberation before the game plan was initiated.  Here are a just a few…

• Who exactly is leading this insurgency and who will be running the show in Libya if the rebels succeed in toppling Gadhafi?
• What happens if the no-fly zone results in a stalemate?  How long could the US potentially be engaged in Libya? 
• Is there any situation where the US would send in ground troops?
• What if Gadhafi simply agrees to relinquish control of the rebel strongholds in the east in exchange for US/NATO withdrawal?  That’s all the rebels really seem to want so they would have their endgame goal.  Does that make a divided Libya an acceptable result to the US/NATO?
• Will US military engagement be the practice de rigueur when insurgents in other countries seek dynamic democratic restructure?

It’s easy to say – after the game – that Butler should have reconsidered its offensive strategy when UConn began its run early in the 2^nd half.  And it is likely that adjustments to the game plan were discussed but the Bulldogs could not successfully implement those changes.  The difference here is that Butler fully considered its opponent’s capabilities and aspirations, understood its own unified goal, knew the game would not end in a stalemate, and recognized the need for a fully-integrated plan of action involving all facets of the team  to succeed in attaining its objective.  To date, nothing coming from the Executive Branch has offered that much clarity with respect to our involvement in Lybia and endgame analysis.

Fast Fact:  Gadhafi has been cagey enough to stay in control of his country for 42 years.  He orchestrated (through Britain) Scotland’s release of a known terrorist on alleged humanitarian grounds.  He employs a deadly 40-member, all-female bodyguard team trained in martial arts and firearms.  And Italy’s Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi thinks Gadhafi is the cat’s pajamas (probably in part because there is a 323 mile pipeline filled with Libyan oil running under the Mediterranean Sea to Sicily).

It’s not that different in Libya for Muammar Gadhafi.  Although he is in a dangerous 4th and Long situation, he is not bringing out his punter to kick the ball back to the Benghazi Runnin’ Rebels.  The result should be about the same as in the Hampton-Duke game, a shellacking.